Jatin Kataria

Jatin Kataria is the Principal Research Scientist at Red Balloon
Security where he architects defensive technologies for embedded
systems. Playing both the role of cat and of mouse at Red Balloon has
many suggesting that he may be the first real source of perpetual
energy. He tires of n-days easily and is always looking for new and
exciting ELF shenanigans, caching complications, and the Fedex guy who
lost his engagement ring. Prior to his time at Red Balloon Security,
Jatin worked at a number of firms as a systems software developer and
earned his Master of Engineering at Columbia University.


100 Seconds of Solitude: Defeating Cisco Trust Anchor With FPGA Bitstream Shenanigans

First commercially introduced in 2013, Cisco Trust Anchor module(TAm) is
a proprietary hardware security module that is used in a wide range of
Cisco products, including enterprise routers, switches and firewalls.
TAm is the foundational root of trust that underpins all other Cisco
security and trustworthy computing mechanisms in such devices. We
disclose two 0-day vulnerabilities and show a remotely exploitable
attack chain that reliably bypasses Cisco Trust Anchor. We present an
in-depth analysis of the TAm, from both theoretical and applied
perspectives. We present a series of architectural and practical flaws
of TAm, describe theoretical methods of attack against such flaws. Next,
we enumerate limitations in current state-of-the-art offensive
capabilities that made the design of TAm seem secure.
Using Cisco 1001-X series of Trust Anchor enabled routers as a
demonstrative platform, we present a detailed analysis of a current
implementation of TAm, including results obtained through hardware
reverse engineering, Trust Anchor FPGA bitstream analysis, and the
reverse engineering of numerous Cisco trustworthy computing mechanisms
that depend on TAm. Finally, we present two 0-day vulnerabilities within
Cisco IOS and TAm and demonstrate a remotely exploitable attack chain
that results in persistent compromise of an up-to-date Cisco router.
We discuss the implementation of our TAm bypass, which involves novel
methods of reliably manipulating FPGA functionality through bitstream
analysis and modification while circumventing the need to perform RTL
reconstruction. The use of our methods of manipulation creates numerous
possibilities in the exploitation of embedded systems that use FPGAs.
While this presentation focuses on the use of our FPGA manipulation
techniques in the context of Cisco Trust Anchor, we briefly discuss
other uses of our bitstream modification techniques.

Hot Tub Island

Take a boat out to Hot Tub Island! Just meet at the dock next to the event venue to catch a ride out.